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FOREWORD: Witchcraft, Culture, and Justice 
 The study of witchcraft in Europe during the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth 
centuries is characterized by a wide range of historical analyses. Some historians focus on those 
regions where witch-hunting was most potent and violent – most notably, in the Holy Roman 
Empire and the surrounding territories. Others choose to examine the periphery of witch-hunting, 
instead focusing on the possible psychological, social, political, or economic causes of its 
emergence. This paper will pay particular attention to regions where witchcraft was much less 
prevalent than in other European jurisdictions – those territories controlled by the Spanish 
Empire during its reign as a global superpower. The regions to be studied will include Spain 
itself, the Seventeen Provinces of the Netherlands, the Italian kingdoms of the Spanish Empire, 
and the Viceroyalty of New Mexico, all of which belonged to the empire for a sizable portion of 
their history. Each region’s distinctive traits, with reference to their historical background, 
cultural status quos, and judicial traditions, contributed to their relative leniency in dealing with 
witches; each case is exceptional and each given region came to this conclusion for its own set of 
reasons. To ascertain these reasons, it will be of particular importance to compare the values that 
these societies hold dear to their policies and interpret their congruence (or lack thereof). This 
interplay between concerns and prosecutorial habits will form a large segment of this paper’s 
foundation. Thus, the argument will be organized in the following fashion: an introduction to 
witchcraft and the varying degrees to which it pervaded European culture; a review of the 
historical background of the Spanish Empire; an analysis of Spain concerning popular culture 
and the Inquisition, a significant part  of Spain’s judicial tradition; scrutiny of the history of the 
Netherlands, Dutch culture and Dutch judicial tradition; a similar review regarding Mexico; an 
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analysis of the same factors in Spanish Italy; and a conclusion in which the above factors will be 
summed and re-evaluated. 
 What must first be established is the definition of witchcraft upon which this paper will 
be constructed. As a cultural phenomenon, witchcraft’s boundaries are less than clear-cut. 
Certain practitioners or historians, such as renowned witchcraft and religion scholar Henry C. 
Lea, will emphasize maleficia, the use of magic or incantations with the intent of harming others, 
whether directly or indirectly. This could include spells invoking pain, disease, bad weather, crop 
failure, animal deaths, or any condition which would result in suffering for the targeted person or 
persons. In many cases, circumstances involving maleficia have been linked to jealousy or 
revenge on the part of the alleged witch, explaining their motivations. However, this remains 
only one of the major facets of witchcraft. Aside from the casting of spells, many witches were 
prosecuted for their suspected association with the devil, known otherwise as diabolism. This 
could, in turn, be related to other activities: in theory, witches frequently copulated with the 
devil, attended Sabbaths with other local witches, sacrificed infants and animals, travelled with 
animal familiars (companions by which they both amplified and drew their dark energy), and 
blasphemed.1 For the purposes of this paper, the definition of witchcraft will include (but not be 
explicitly limited to) all these phenomena, which can be examined through the lenses of court 
records, historical debates, and treatises highlighting the activities of accused witches. It remains 
important to understand that witchcraft is dynamic, constantly changing both through time and 
between regions; thus,  this paper will require an examination of witchcraft in several different 
areas (as mentioned above, these will include Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Mexico) in order 
to ascertain a wider comprehension of its influences and purposes. That being said, the timeline 
for studying these areas will not fall beyond the era of 1500-1800; these centuries saw a peak in 
                                                          
1
 Henry Charles Lea, A History of the Inquisition in Spain. (New York: MacMillan Company, 1907), 3:379 
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which prosecution, from which we can infer an increase in either witch activity or the fear of 
witchcraft.  
While this increase in prosecution represents the general trend throughout Europe, certain 
regions serve as exemptions from the rule. England is commonly cited as an example of a region 
in which witchcraft was prosecuted with less zeal than in mainland Europe; however, the scope 
of this paper will include England or its prosecutorial habits. Rather, the main focus of 
comparison will be laid upon central northern Europe – mostly the regions in the Holy Roman 
Empire – where witch-hunting was at its most severe. Not only will this paper seek to draw on 
this comparison to convey the relative leniency of witchcraft prosecution in the Spanish Empire, 
but it will also attempt to illustrate that each major region in the empire had different reasons for 
developing this attitude towards witchcraft. That is to say, Spanish territories generally showed a 
level of restraint and caution in prosecuting witches that was unheard of in the Germanic regions 
where witch-hunting saw the most activity. Careful review will additionally expose that this is 
not, in fact, the result of an omnipotent Spanish presence, but rather that each territory came to 
the conclusion that witchcraft was not as large of a threat as other areas believed for their own set 
of unique reasons. The first task in approaching this argument is to analyze the Spanish Empire 
and its policies towards witchcraft. However, prior to examining witchcraft within the empire, it 
is important to understand how and why the empire came into existence so as to better grasp the 
political environment in which this cultural phenomenon emerged. 
INTRODUCTION: Spain’s Rise and Fall, 711-1643 
The conquering of the Iberian Peninsula in the early eighth century by the Persian 
invaders claiming allegiance to the Umayyad Caliphate did much to break whatever unity the 
proto-Spanish inhabitants had exhibited. Over the nearly eight hundred years that followed, 
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Spanish and other armies fought to reclaim the peninsula in what became known as the 
Reconquista (“the reconquest”). The Province of Al-Andalus, ruled by the various Persian 
dynasties that succeeded one another during this period, consisted of the territories on the 
peninsula that had been conquered by these early Berber invaders. The suffusion of Muslim 
traditions into those of early Spanish society created a hybridized culture whose effects on early 
modern Spain were profound and far-reaching. By the mid-fifteenth century, the Spanish had 
driven out all Muslim presence on the peninsula aside from that in the Emirate of Granada, but 
this was accomplished in 1492 to complete the unification of Iberia beneath Spanish and 
Portuguese rule.  
This is not to say, however, that rulers of the Spanish autonomous kingdoms during this 
period were completely focused on reclaiming the lost territory. Other events, such as the 
Crusades, fighting between the kingdoms, and unstable and short-lived systems of alliances, all 
presented themselves as distractions from the goals of the Reconquista. However, the peninsula 
was nevertheless eventually retaken, an event which would lead to a period of unprecedented 
Spanish superiority. Even after the completion of the Reconquista, though, the presence of 
religious and cultural minorities brought about significant unrest that would eventually form the 
rationale behind the establishment of the Spanish Inquisition. Certain events preceded and 
surrounded the establishment of the Inquisition, but none defined its purpose with such salience 
as the Reconquista. In the centuries following the unification of Spain, a number of events 
contributed to the spread of the rising state's power and influence. 
After the War of Castilian Succession fought from 1475 to 1479 and the Treaty of 
Alcáçovas that ended it, the polity which would one day become modern Spain was united 
beneath the Catholic Monarchs, Isabella I of Castile and Ferdinand II of Aragon. At the peak of 
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the Age of Discovery, a period traditionally associated with Spanish and Portuguese global 
domination and expansion, Isabella and Ferdinand financed Cristóbal Colón (more widely 
known as Christopher Columbus) on his trip across the Atlantic Ocean, eventually resulting in 
the claiming of many territories in the Americas in the name of Spain. At the same time, the 
monarchs planned intermarriages between their children and rulers in Austria, England, the Holy 
Roman Empire, Portugal, and Wales in order to solidify their presence on the continent. In 1516, 
King Carlos I – who was crowned Charles V, the Holy Roman Emperor, in 1519 – ascended to 
the throne, uniting through marriage many of the Habsburg and Spanish lands, including Spanish 
overseas territories in both the Americas and the Caribbean as well as regions on the European 
continent such as Franche-Comté in eastern France and the Netherlands.  
Following this union, the Spanish Empire is said to have witnessed its golden age, later 
referred to as the siglo de oro (literally, the “century of gold”). This distinction comes not only 
from the immense and far-reaching power that the empire was able to exert, but also due to the 
massive influx of wealth that Spain enjoyed as a result of its gold-rich holdings in the New 
World. During the Protestant Reformation, the Spanish Empire sought to maintain centralized 
“hard-line” Catholic authority, but these efforts proved difficult to uphold in the face of 
overwhelming Protestant opposition, eventually forcing Charles V to sign the Peace of Augsburg 
in 1555 and to abdicate later that year. The siglo de oro continued despite this as Spain defeated 
numerous enemies abroad, including France at the Battle of St. Quentin in 1558 and the Ottoman 
Empire at the Battle of Lepanto in 1571. These victories assured continued Spanish dominance 
on the continent, which was only called into question after economic and social struggles broke 
the empire down internally. By 1643, Spain’s enemies closed in on imperial borders, and the 
Spanish defeat at the hands of the French at the Battle of Rocroi is frequently considered to be 
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the culmination of the slow, deteriorative process that had been gradually eroding Spanish 
power.  
Section I: Witchcraft Outside of the Spanish Empire 
 At the same time that Spain was enjoying its reign as a global superpower, other regions 
of Europe were undergoing a powerful religious transformation: the Protestant Reformation. This 
served as the backdrop for some of the most zealous and fervent witch-hunting, a phenomenon 
that was especially prevalent in northern central Europe (in what would become modern 
Germany). This can be at least partly attributed to the publishing of the Malleus Maleficarum, a 
treatise on witchcraft written by Heinrich Kramer in 1486. The treatise outlined some of the 
purposes and methods of combating witchcraft and was one of the most prominent documents on 
the subject.2 Some of the most stereotypical portrayals of witches that we see today – groups of 
crones huddled together in dark forest clearings, celebrating a black mass and invoking the devil 
– come from accounts or testimonies recorded in this region, encouraging us to examine the area 
as a baseline of witch prosecution to which we can compare Spanish treatment of the same 
issues. Data show that the accused “came mainly from the lower socio-economic groups… [and] 
belonged to families that were on their way down through the social structure” and that “the 
typical witch was the wife or widow of an agricultural labourer or small tenant farmer, and she 
was well known for a quarrelsome and aggressive nature.”3 While this illustrates the 
conventional image of a witch, it does nothing in terms of explaining the differences of beliefs 
held between residents of the Spanish Empire as opposed to those of northern central Europe. 
Geoffrey Scarre suggests that as many as 100,000 witches may have been tried, sentenced, and 
                                                          
2
 Lea, Inquisition in Spain, 3:543. 
3
 Ibid., 26. 
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executed in early modern Europe, many of which took place in “the 1590s, the years around 
1630 and the 1660s.”4 However, it remains in question why northern central Europe was 
responsible for such a large proportion of these events. 
To account for this discrepancy, Scarre continues on to say that “both Italy and Spain, the 
heartlands of the Inquisition, saw surprisingly few witchcraft trials, with the peak of prosecutions 
being over as early as 1550. What trials there were tended to take place in the northern parts of 
these countries, close to borders with other witch-hunting regions.”5 Scarre believes this to be a 
result of the Inquisition’s high standard for evidence.6 On the other hand, regions outside of the 
empire were slower to warm up to such judicial restrictions, being swayed instead by shifting 
cultural values. The gradual pervasion of Enlightenment philosophy into the strata of society 
meant that people began to be less inclined to believe in the notion that they were “being 
surrounded by invisible spiritual presences”7, laying to rest many of the fears of witches being 
able to influence events relating to disease, weather, or wealth. Some of the most important ideas 
drawn from this period – the scientific method, proof by logic, and nascent rationalist thought – 
all seemed to hint at the notion that an extreme paranoia of witchcraft could be called into 
question. Strikingly, the Inquisition was able to reach its goal of reducing the influence and 
spread of witchcraft, but instead of accomplishing this through a lengthy period of prosecution or 
a reign of terrorizing witch-hunting, they were simply more skeptical of the crime in itself. This 
comes as a surprise in itself, as the Catholic centers of Spain and Italy were largely responsible 
for instilling fear of any behaviors that would undermine the goals of the Church. In contrast, the 
areas that were already most susceptible to the spread of Protestantism – northern central Europe 
                                                          
4
 Geoffrey Scarre, Witchcraft and Magic in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Europe (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: 
Humanities Press International, 1988), 19-20. 
5
 Ibid., 21. 
6
 Ibid., 22. 
7
 Ibid., 55. 
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included – were more likely to continue witch-hunting with additional fanaticism and for a 
longer period of time. In this sense, the Spanish Empire remains a fascinating example for 
several reasons. Foremost among these reasons is the fact that its key component territories 
during the peak of its power – Spain, Mexico, Italy, and the Netherlands – all seemed to exhibit 
relatively lax prosecutorial behaviors. 
Section II: What Differentiated Spanish Imperial Territories? 
From the ancient civilizations of South America to the well-established Italian society 
centered around the ruins of the Roman Empire, cultures that had experienced their own rises 
and falls in the centuries preceding their inclusion into Spanish territory existed throughout the 
empire. Consequently, every region of the empire exhibited its own sense of tradition and set of 
beliefs. The culture of a given society can be determined not by the consensus of any single 
portion of the society (such as an economic class, a political party, or a social stratum), but rather 
by the summation of beliefs across all such layers. This is not to say, though, that certain groups 
did not have more or less influence on the judicial outcomes to be analyzed. For example, one 
group of particular importance is the educated ecclesiastical authorities employed by the various 
Inquisitions – those who acted as judges, trial officials, and administrators of legislation were 
responsible for many events concerned with witchcraft prosecution (as well as other types of 
prosecution). Nonetheless, they obtained their points of view and the rationale upon which they 
based their rulings from elite philosophy and culture, whether it came in the form of the Dutch 
philosopher Desiderius Erasmus’ humanist writings, Ignatius of Loyola’s dense pro-Catholic 
literature, or anything in between these two extremes. Ultimately, the influence which culture, 
literature, and common beliefs had upon the process of witch-hunting was profound, both inside 
and outside of the boundaries of the empire. 
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Practices revolving around accusations of witchcraft, including trials, sentencing, 
punishment, humiliation, torture, and executions varied greatly according to the jurisdictional 
region. At the same time, the severity of the prosecution was inconsistent at best on a case-to-
case basis; a trial which could have ended in a burning or another public execution in one region 
may have ended in an acquittal or a release in another region. Thus, the many different 
treatments of witchcraft were a consequence of several factors and. Though all of the individual 
regions of the empire fell under the jurisdiction of the Spanish crown, they each had their own 
individual cultural and social notions of witchcraft and are often studied separately from one 
another. This method excludes the deeply significant fact that, despite being geographically 
separated, these regions were all part of the overarching polity that was the Spanish Empire. This 
implies, naturally, that most of these territories fell under the sway of Spanish law. Whether this 
law was explicitly enforced or updated regularly depended upon several factors, including but 
not limited to the region’s relative proximity to the Inquisition’s main seat of power in Spain, 
cultural notions relating to torture, trials, and witchcraft, the current system of justice employed 
by local courts, and the types and quality of legislation relevant to law enforcement and trial 
procedure on a case-to-case basis. Though scholars have explored specific circumstances of 
witchcraft in many of the regions of the Spanish Empire, few have compared one another in the 
context of their greater commonality as parts of the Empire. When this analysis is conducted, a 
significant trend reveals itself: the territories under the Spanish crown behaved with more 
restraint and clemency towards accused witches than those outside of the empire.  
Historians have traditionally attempted to define both the Inquisition and the Spanish 
Empire in terms of general, overarching properties that characterize them as whole entities. For 
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example, the Inquisition is seen as a violent and terrible body of judicial extremism,8 while the 
Spanish Empire is typically characterized as a polity steeped in Catholicism and imperialistic 
conquest. These definitions are fundamentally flawed, as both are enormous and influential 
bodies with any number of subcomponents and smaller organizational compartments into which 
they can be divided. For the Inquisition, this involves its partitioning into jurisdictional regions; 
in the case of the empire, the regionalization of its territorial holdings is simple and, for the most 
part, determinable by their relative geographies. It should only follow naturally that with each 
jurisdictional and geographic region, there exists a blend of culture, religion, and philosophy 
unique to that area. The indigenous populations of these regions were wholly non-Spanish, 
lending an entirely foreign aspect to those Spanish conquerors who would seek to assimilate 
them into the greater body of the empire. In addition, Spanish subjects who migrated to these 
conquered regions were ill-adapted to conform to their new environments, making the 
distribution and integration of Spanish culture a slow and largely unsuccessful process (contrary 
to the example of the Umayyad Moors in eighth century Spain). Instead, these regions often 
formed their own social concepts based on a mixture of indigenous and Spanish culture, whether 
in the case of the Native Americans, Dutch, Italians, or others. Following from this, the treatment 
of accused witches could only vary with each region’s own perspectives on the practice, 
examination, and punishment of those accused of witchcraft. No pan-Spanish view could be 
maintained across such a geographically and socially diverse panorama of cultures, and thus 
perceptions of witchcraft tended to be fluid, carrying different connotations and meanings 
between regions of the empire. Simply put, there were no two courts or tribunals in the Empire 
that would have just cause to issue the same verdict for the same reasons given the same 
circumstances of a trial. Rather, similar verdicts might occur, but not for the same reasons. 
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 Lea, Inquisition in Spain, 4:525. 
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Discrepancies between various regions – whether those being discussed in this paper or 
others – have often given rise to historiographical discussion on a wide variety of topics. 
Scholars who have studied the Inquisition and its treatment of witchcraft have traditionally 
attempted to isolate regions of the Spanish Empire according to hypotheses that solely address 
the region in question. For example, in his text Zumárraga and the Mexican Inquisition, Richard 
E. Greenleaf posits that the Mexican Inquisition is a prime circumstance of cultural integration in 
place of assimilation wherein indigenous society mixed with the arrival of conquistador culture 
and begat a subculture different from the sum of its parts. Mulatto and creole societies split away 
from their antecedents, indicative of the rise of subcultures in lieu of those from which they 
originated. In another circumstance, Marijke Gijswijt-Hofstra, a professor of history at the 
University of Amsterdam, writes in her article “Witchcraft in the Northern Netherlands” that the 
Dutch conceptualization of witchcraft contradicts many Spanish ideas on the matter. In 
prosecuting accused witches, Spanish courts were chiefly concerned with the diabolist aspect of 
witchcraft, whereas Dutch prosecutors tended to focus on maleficia and the harm that alleged 
witches could cause to animals and to others. A final major example resides among the Roman 
Inquisition, the branch of the Spanish Inquisition established to maintain order among the Italian 
kingdoms under the jurisdiction of the Spanish Empire. Professor David Gentilcore of the 
University of Leicester hypothesizes in his study From Bishop to Witch: the System of the Sacred 
in Early Modern Terra d’Otranto that “the common view that witchcraft was more pagan 
superstition and ignorance than diabolical apostasy… was coupled with the rare use of torture, 
central control and assigning little weight to the denunciations made by accused witches”9 in the 
Italian kingdoms of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Despite these distinctions, every 
                                                          
9
 David Gentilcore, From Bishop to Witch: the System of the Sacred in Early Modern Terra d’Otranto (New York: 
Manchester University Press, 1992), 241. 
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region of the empire was subject to its own cultural influences, law codes, and historical 
circumstances which, in turn, influenced the outcomes of their local witchcraft trials. That is not 
to say that these outcomes were necessarily predictable by synthesizing these predictive factors – 
every individual held their own views on the issue, as evidenced by the multitude of documents 
available that reveal debates between prominent ecclesiastical figures. 
Section III: Debate on the Subject in Early Modern Europe 
During the late 15th and early 16th centuries, debate ran hot on the subjects of witchcraft 
and heresy. The publication of the Malleus Maleficarum was only one part of a greater 
movement to bring about awareness of the dangers of witchcraft. The treatment of accused 
witches was consistently one of much contention – many individual inquisitors took it upon 
themselves to individualize the punishments that they issued, basing the severity of the sentence 
on the magnitude of the crime (among other things, such as available evidence or confessions). 
Debates of the subject were frequent, addressing the issue of a crime whose penalty carried only 
vague outlines. One such debate is recorded in the Deliberations on the Reality and Heresy of 
Witchcraft, a series of discourses between ten bishops and theologians in which they addressed 
several relatively unanswered questions concerning the prosecution of accused witches. The 
discourse was “provoked by… the prosecution and execution of dozens of witches in Navarre by 
a secular magistrate”10 in 1526, spurring a discussion that sought to answer a series of important 
questions on the matter. These questions dealt with the witches’ intent (or if they were tricked 
into confessing to or performing witchcraft), whether or not they could be tried in a secular court 
following the proceedings in inquisitional courts, whether their punishments should be the same 
if they were tricked or not, whether knowledge of maleficia constituted heresy (for both the 
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 Lu Ann Homza, trans., The Spanish Inquisition 1478-1614: An Anthology of Sources (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 2006), 154. 
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accused and for inquisitors), whether confessions of the accused were sufficient evidence for 
“the greatest ordinary penalty"11, and what each investigator believed was the best solution to 
preemptively combat and presumably end the threat of witchcraft. 
The discourse between the aforementioned ten religious authorities reveals both the fact 
that such debates took place, even among preeminent theologians of the era, and that many 
varying viewpoints were commonplace in these debates. For example, when asked to consider 
“for the witches who really commit murders, whether they must be exiled or relaxed [relegated 
to a secular court instead of an ecclesiastical one], or handed over to a secular court after their 
reconciliation [in an ecclesiastical court], so they may be struck with worthy penalties for their 
actions,"12 answers varied from “they must be completely destroyed”13 to “they should be 
prosecuted as if they were heretics. But if they confess their crimes from their own free will, they 
should be treated with more compassion than heretics.”14 The former response, expressed by Dr. 
Coronel, a doctor of theology, is among the more drastic decisions; that being said, he continues, 
noting that punishment issued by inquisitorial courts should only match that which is required by 
Christian law, whereas other offenses should be handled by secular courts. Towards the other 
end of the spectrum, Dr. Guevara and Master Arrieta propose more lenient treatment of the 
accused. Dr. Guevara suggests that, should it be “conclusively proven that [the accused is a 
heretic],”15 the assigned penalty be equivalent to a secular court’s in a typical case of heresy. On 
the other hand, if the accused offers no confession of their own, then Dr. Guevara suggests the 
case be relaxed to a secular court instead. This distinction is of particular interest, since it reveals 
the weight of confessions, which remained a prominent facet of witchcraft trials for several 
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centuries. Master Arrieta supports the importance of confessions, stating that confessions should 
cause the accused to be “treated with greater compassion than heretics.”16 While the responses to 
this question covered a wide range of possible views, it should be noted that suggested 
punishments of a severity similar to that highlighted in Dr. Coronel’s response were in the clear 
minority of the group, whereas leniency was favored by many of the theologians polled. The 
most important conclusion to draw from this matter is that the prevailing opinion on what the 
appropriate jurisdiction for witchcraft trials was remained one of relative leniency; in other 
words, the sample drawn from these ten people indicates that intellectuals tended to be in favor 
of deferring the judgment of accused witches to secular courts rather than inquisitorial or 
ecclesiastical ones. 
The second question concerned the relative punishment of witches depending on whether 
or not they had been tricked into either committing acts of witchcraft or confessing to doing so 
(or both). The Bishop of Gaudix contends that “the same penalty should be given when [accused 
witches] are fooled as when they truly go to the Devil’s assemblies,”17 indicating his belief that it 
was insignificant whether or not the witch was aware of their alleged crimes. In contrast, the 
aforementioned Master Arrieta writes that “[accused witches] should not be punished by the 
same penalty when they actually commit the maleficia as when they are fooled,” stating that “the 
exterior act aggravates the interior crime.”18 The exterior act he is referring to is the punishment 
of the witches, and the interior crime is the maleficia; the significance of this statement lies in the 
relative clemency that Arrieta’s stance extends to accused witches, offering some compassion to 
those who have been tricked into being prosecuted. 
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This suggests several things. First, it alludes to the fact that some believed that one could 
be deceived into practicing or confessing to practicing witchcraft. This powerful notion would 
exonerate many alleged witches of their crime; it was not uncommon for convictions to operate 
on confessions alone, some of which would be ascertained in the face of torture or 
interrogation.19 Secondly, it reveals that those same people who believed in the possibility of 
deception and trickery simultaneously believed that it was a crime to be blamed on the deceiver 
rather than on the deceived. Importantly, the accused witch is not completely blame-free; they 
are still charged with committing the witchcraft, but if their motivation is determined to not be of 
their own design, then the aforementioned deliberators believe they should receive a less harsh 
penalty. While the inquisitors do not completely agree with one another, the most important 
aspect of their discourse is the presence of multiple conflicting points of view, demonstrating 
that even matters of law and religion were not as clear-cut as legislators would have preferred. 
While these deliberations are just one instance of the debates that occurred in the Spanish 
Empire (and, as a matter of fact, throughout Europe and the Americas) in the period of 1500-
1800, they are of considerable significance. As stated above, they show that interpretations of the 
law were convoluted and often could not be viewed one way and not another; most trials of 
witchcraft accusations were resolved on a case-by-case basis, their outcomes determined by 
specific amounts and types of evidence, confessions, interrogation techniques, whether it was 
being initially tried in a secular or ecclesiastical court, the nuanced cultural traditions of the 
region in which the trial took place, and the personal beliefs of the individual judges or 
inquisitors. This last caveat is demonstrated impeccably by the disagreements between the ten 
theologians of the Deliberations, who scarcely share an opinion through the entire document. Of 
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course, the views expressed in the Deliberations are far from conclusive on overarching 
sentiments concerning witchcraft in the Spanish Empire; though the ten individuals are all 
scholars of religion, they by no means purport to represent every reasonable or possible belief. 
Still, they serve as an important indication that such debate did exist. 
In a different instance, Martín Del Rio, a Jesuit scholar of Spanish lineage living in 
northwestern Europe during the 16th and 17th centuries, makes a case for the moderate treatment 
of accused witches. In his treatise Investigations into Magic, Del Rio provides an exceptional 
account of a myriad of topics related to witchcraft, such as frequent activities, types of magic and 
maleficia, and, most importantly, the role that he believes judges presiding over witchcraft trials 
should be responsible for and the duty they should fulfill. As a doctor of law, Del Rio frequently 
interjects legal commentary into his explanations, offering a justified perspective on his 
rationale. Whereas the above deliberators were mostly theologians by occupation, Del Rio is also 
able to assess the prosecution of witches from a secular legal standpoint. While this might 
suggest a clear, black-and-white argument, his declarations are anything but. As a Jesuit scholar, 
Del Rio also draws influences from his religious background, justifying his assertions with 
evidence from both Scripture and from local law codes. In defining judges’ roles in witchcraft 
trials, he first endeavors to define how and why witchcraft is a crime to be prosecuted. Del Rio’s 
views are clear: “[witchcraft] is… a crime of great enormity… because in it are combined the 
particular circumstances of outrageous crimes – apostasy, heresy, sacrilege, blasphemy, murder, 
and not infrequently parricide, unnatural sexual intercourse with a spiritual creature, and hatred 
of God.”20 Despite this, Del Rio is careful to point out that the gravity of the crime is no reason 
for a judge to abuse their power. Paraphrasing, P. G. Maxwell-Stuart writes that “Del Rio 
observes that in punishing this kind of criminal, a judge should not without a very good reason 
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exceed the penalty laid down by the law. Nor should he hand down a milder punishment, but 
rather apply the letter of the law.”21 Thereafter, the punishment and interrogation of accused 
witches becomes a topic of great significance in the text. 
 Del Rio repeatedly emphasizes how much he is personally aggrieved by alleged 
practitioners of witchcraft; he believes their treatment should adhere strictly to the legal codes set 
in place. For example, he states that “no one is permitted under any circumstances to kill workers 
of harmful magic on his own authority.”22 In this circumstance, murder – even should the 
murderer attempt to justify it by citing their victim’s practicing of magic – is never allowed, as 
would hold true for anyone who caught another type of criminal in the act. Simultaneously, Del 
Rio writes that “anyone, however, is permitted to arrest and bring before a judge those who have 
been caught clearly committing a crime.”23 By saying so, Del Rio is promoting the fair and equal 
treatment of being allowed a trial in front of a judge. As a scholar of both law and of religion, he 
sees both the atrocious, Catholic-offending aspect of diabolism and maleficia as well as the 
necessity to provide any person, regardless of their crime, with an opportunity to defend 
themselves.  Del Rio even goes so far as to defend the rights of those who have been imprisoned 
unjustly, contending that “those workers of harmful magic who have been imprisoned unduly, 
even if they break out of prison, should not be punished for doing so, nor be considered to have 
confessed their guilty by doing so, nor be expected to return to prison even if they have promised 
to return.”24 By making these points, Del Rio alludes to the fact that these occurrences were both 
common and problematic. Undoubtedly, a person falsely convicted of witchcraft or imprisoned 
on suspicions of such a crime would desire freedom rather than incarceration, perhaps causing 
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instances of flight from jails. Whether or not this flight was indicative of innocence or guilt is not 
immediately determinable – rather, Del Rio continues to invest in the power of legal codes by 
insisting that guilt be uncovered by way of a trial before a judge rather than implied guilt through 
actions unrelated to the crime. This distinction is of particular weight since it dismisses the 
notion that actions factually irrelevant to the crime (such as confessions, failure to pass trials by 
ordeal, or other superstitious or anecdotal “evidence”) are admissible as proof of one’s guilt. 
 As for these selfsame confessions, Del Rio explicitly condemns torture as a means of 
obtaining evidence. He writes that “[the judge] should refrain from using torture if by doing so 
he can get the truth, since the application of torture often produces unreliable results. The type of 
torture used is left to the judge’s discretion, but he should temper it with careful consideration 
and equity.”25 The conflict concerning the use of torture comes from a willingness to confess in 
the face of torture, even if the accused is innocent; to avoid torture, the accused might admit to a 
crime he did not commit, perhaps even revealing several of his friends or acquaintances to be 
“associates” and fellow witches in order to relieve the judge’s focus on him. Del Rio discussed 
this matter with Philip Numann, the town clerk of Brussels. In one letter from Numann to Del 
Rio, Numann writes “any judge must make sure he is absolutely scrupulous, because a 
confession in this matter should not be held as sufficient proof since it may be proceeding from a 
mind which has been deceived and is in error.”26 In this same letter, Numann manages to return 
to the topic of delusion which so plagued the ten theologians of the aforementioned 
Deliberations. He wholeheartedly accepts the notion that witches could have been tricked into 
believing themselves guilty, or into committing witchcraft – in fact, he is staunchly convinced of 
it. He writes “it is obvious that learned men who write on the subject of witches agree to a man 
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that the silly women are often deluded and deceived… and certainly [believe] that they really 
have carried out and done things they have seen merely in their fantasy, caused by the Devil.”27 
Such conviction, particularly in combination with the assertion that it is so widely believed, 
speaks to the broad support that this theory received. Del Rio’s correspondence with Numann, in 
addition to the Deliberations of the ten theologians, provides a solid basis for analysis of 
common strands of thought in witches’ prosecution. 
As evidenced by the above theologians, views on witchcraft prosecution policy were 
always subject to variance. While Del Rio suggests that judges’ decisions should “adhere to the 
letter of the law”, he also believes that each case may vary slightly depending on specific 
circumstances. That is to say, the punishment should not exceed the severity allotted by the law, 
but the judge may exhibit some leniency if the conditions of the case allowed. This concept has 
already set the standard for a less harsh trend in legal interpretation as related to witchcraft trials. 
The examination of individual witches on a case-to-case basis allows for each one to be 
scrutinized as a product of the circumstances surrounding their case as opposed to a product of 
cultural misconceptions, revenge plots, jealousy, fear, and a number of other generalized factors 
that would normally apply to every case. These factors suggested guilt rather than innocence due 
to the strongly negative opinions of witchcraft that were common, particularly among the lower 
classes. Consequently, this case-by-case analysis by individual jurors might promote additional 
judicial leniency. Apart from individuals’ beliefs, though, the other factors mentioned above are 
equally important to analyze to provide a fuller rationale for why witchcraft trials resulted in the 
ways that they did. In order to do so, we will examine the structure of Spain’s system of justice 
as a lens through which these trials may be viewed.  
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Section IV: Spain and the Spanish Inquisition 
Prior to a discussion of the Inquisition’s handling of witchcraft trials, it is important to 
note that Spanish conceptions of witchcraft, witches, sorcery, magic, maleficia, diabolism, and 
related concepts were, for the most part, markedly different from those of other regions in 
Europe. Belief in witchcraft, superstition, and other related subjects was, not infrequently, looked 
down upon or even scorned. Henry Kamen, a British historian and scholar of the Inquisition, 
notes “there was always an important number of theologians and bishops in both Italy and Spain 
who considered that talk of flying through the air and copulation with the devil was a delusion to 
be pitied rather than punished.”28 This perception of those who accused others of and admitted to 
performing witchcraft contributed to an overall unclear notion on how to treat accused witches – 
the Inquisition did not seek to punish those who were perceived as innocent, and the common 
Spanish view of witchcraft was that it was a pitiable offense rather than a prosecutable one. As 
Kamen explains, two examples of the Inquisition’s relative leniency occurred in 1665: 
The tribunal [of Barcelona] uncovered a group of middle-class diabolists… a 
priest in the group was suspended from holy orders for five years, and a surgeon 
was flogged and banished for the same length of time. In the same year Isabel 
Amada, a widow… was denounced by shepherds who had refused to give her 
alms; within three days, they said, ‘two of their mules and thirty sheep died, and 
the accused claimed that she had done it with the help of the devil’. She was set 
free by the inquisitors. Such lenient verdicts would have been unthinkable in other 
European countries.29 
 
As expressed by the author in this passage, the Inquisition’s treatment of accused witches was 
comparatively lax when compared to other European jurisdictions, particularly those of northern 
and central Europe. Additionally, the passage implies that other European countries were hesitant 
to apply the same judicial restraint that the inquisitors in this instance were able to exhibit. This 
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can largely be accounted for by the widespread opinions shared by much of the Spanish 
population, who believed witchcraft to be a possible symptom of insanity or mental instability. 
Because of the idea that witchcraft was hardly something to be feared but almost something to be 
ridiculed, rulings tended to favor the innocence of those accused of witchcraft (whether by 
themselves or by their peers). 
In terms of judicial proceedings, traditions of the centuries preceding the establishment of 
the Spanish Empire were largely geared towards the accusatorial system of justice. A significant 
paradigmatic shift in trial law occurred towards the end of the fifteenth century.  Prior to this era, 
“counsel were not allowed to the accused and it became a settled principle… that advocates who 
undertook the defence [sic] of heretics were suspended from their functions and were perpetually 
infamous.”30 Later, as the inquisitorial system grew to replace the formerly prevalent accusatorial 
system of justice, advocates were appointed more frequently to defend the accused. These trials 
were frequently overseen by inquisitors or ecclesiastical officials who, though they were armed 
with canon and Inquisition law, often injected – at least to a certain degree – their personal creed 
or morals into their rulings. This flaw is reflected in the writings of Alonso de Salazar Frías, an 
inquisitor employed by the tribunal in Logroño in Spain. In one letter to the Inquisitor General 
following a court case which he oversaw (along with other inquisitors), he writes “we failed to 
write down many important things concerning the defendants…. We omitted to record the 
disputes and rejoinders, writing only the final resolution of each point. We thus surpressed the 
inconsistencies and irrelevancies which could have further weakened the defendants’ 
creditworthiness.”31 As the Suprema was far from where many trials took place, the allegedly 
omnipresent arm of the Inquisition was only vaguely effective in this duty. Whatever 
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centralization had been made possible by the centralization of the Inquisition’s power into the 
Suprema was nearly rendered obsolete, despite its efforts towards branching out by means of the 
establishment of myriad tribunals throughout the Empire. As a result, legal gray areas arose on 
matters not explicitly covered by written law, especially regarding the treatment of accused 
witches. This was, additionally, a consequence of the Inquisition’s precautionary nature 
regarding certain aspects of defining the law – “in the enlightened view taken by the Inquisition 
regarding witchcraft, instructions of 1537 indicate a disposition to regard reputed witches as 
insane.”32 This designation meant that a great change was taking place in cultural interpretations 
of witchcraft: accused witches were no longer to be treated as heretics, but as mentally unstable 
and thus free of true legal blame. The difficulties faced in determining the proper method of 
dealing with an accused witch become apparent in one example: the trial of Lucrecia de León, a 
twenty-one year old girl who was tried in Toledo in 1590 for claiming to have prophetic dreams 
and ultimately convicted for multiple crimes, including diabolism. 
In explaining the background of Lucrecia’s case, Richard Kagan outlines the pre-existing 
judicial environment into which her case emerged. After 1561, the year in which Inquisitional 
legal standards were last revised, documents detailing trials of faith explained that a trial would 
take place in the following order: a denunciation, a decision by the judges to pursue the case, a 
gathering and evaluation of evidence, a decision by the judges to continue, hearings with the 
accused, accusations against the accused, defense by the accused, decision by judges, and the 
sentence.33 This sequence gives us important insight into the process that an accused witch 
would undergo in a trial scenario – one aspect of particular interest is the repeated instruction to 
the judges to decide whether or not the case was worth examining. By asking for such a decision 
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following the initial accusation, judges were able to filter out cases with insufficient grounds or 
evidence. Subsequently, by asking the same question following the presentation of evidence, 
they were able to prevent people from being tried who had no chance of being convicted (barring 
a voluntary confession). Another imperative aspect of the trial of faith was frequently reflected in 
a recitation of prayers by the accused – if they were able to recite certain prayers such as the Ave 
Maria and the Credo, they were deemed to have sufficient religious knowledge.34 However, in 
spite of all the instructions that were laid out to give order to trials of faith, Lucrecia’s trial in 
particular stretched on for a little over five years and became an example of Inquisitional 
mismanagement and infrastructural failures. Verdicts among the acting inquisitors were almost 
never unanimous, numerous officials were arrested or suspended for suspicions related to 
conspiracy, and even though Lucrecia’s sentence ended up being the most merciful that the 
Inquisition could offer – “one hundred lashes, banishment from Madrid, and two years’ seclusion 
in a religious house”35 – the punishment proved difficult to administer. Inquisitors noted that “in 
the absence of an executioner, the administration of the one hundred lashes had to be postponed 
for almost a week,”36 and that no religious houses would accept her in light of the crimes she had 
been convicted of. This bureaucratic mess serves us best as an example of both the Inquisition’s 
fallibility and the possibility of judicial leniency in the face of frustration, prolonged prosecution, 
unwillingness to cooperate by judges and others, and corruption of officials related to trials, 
imprisonment, and even to the church. At the same time, this remains a single example to be 
considered among a plethora of others. 
The Spanish Inquisition emerges in some older accounts – such as those of Lea – as a 
terror-inducing, hybridized legislative-judicial entity of immense reach and power, capable of 
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locating, trying, sentencing, and executing any subject who would dare decry Catholicism, the 
legitimacy of Spanish governance, or the fundamental tenets of these institutions. In the last 
century, however, historians such as Gustav Henningsen and Ruth Martin have chosen to analyze 
the Inquisition through less of a fearful lens, discussing instead the benefits and order it bestowed 
upon the Spanish Empire during its operations. Though the Inquisition has somewhat rightly 
gained a reputation as a violent and aggressive organization, it was, without question, capable of 
judiciary discretion. In addition, the widespread nature of the empire, the largest in the world 
during much of the early modern period, with territories in northern Europe, central and South 
America, the Italian peninsula, the Pacific, and small regions of Africa, contributed to variations 
in inquisitorial practices. The difficulties of governing a vast, multi-hemispheric empire included 
endemic lapses and delays in communication. 
Though a study of the Inquisition will typically begin at its inception in 1478 as an 
organization almost solely focused on prosecuting conversos and moriscos, inquisitors were 
commissioned for duty as early as 1232, though their duties were much different at the time and 
they were not organized into the cohesive body that came to be known as the Inquisition. In the 
century following the establishment of the Inquisition as its own entity in 1478, twenty tribunals 
were established. Some, such as those in Logroño, Barcelona, Zaragoza, Madrid, and Toledo 
were in Spain, while others were established in Spanish territories, such as those in Palermo (in 
Sicily), Las Palmas (in the Canary Islands), Sassari (in Sardinia), Mexico (in the Viceroyalty of 
Mexico), and Lima (in the Viceroyalty of Peru). In the latter case, remoteness made 
centralization and judicial consistency a challenge. Consequently, attempts to establish a 
common code of law to be enforced by all branches and tribunals would prove difficult. For this 
reason, variations in Inquisitorial behavior began to emerge as individual tribunals and 
26 
 
inquisitors mixed vague legislation with their own cultural contexts, systems of belief, and 
outside influences. Separation, both geographical and psychological, from the center of 
Inquisition authority at the Suprema would give way to external pressures that swayed 
inquisitors. It is most interesting to note, however, that inquisitors almost unanimously tended to 
treat witches with more leniency than secular judges or judges outside of the empire – but for a 
multitude of different reasons. 
Prior to its official inception as a judicial body aimed at proselytizing Catholic dissidents, 
Spain utilized the Inquisition and its investigators known as inquisitors “as part of a campaign 
against Catharism,”37 a Christian sect originating in southern France. Later, when the monarchs 
of Spain saw fit to employ a new prosecutorial entity to maintain homogeneity of belief in their 
territories, they transformed the Inquisition by creating the Consejo de la Suprema y General 
Inquisición in 1483. Referred to as the Suprema, this was the Inquisition’s main operating body 
and had the final word on all the judicial proceedings that it oversaw. It was composed of “three 
ecclesiastical members, and a fourth member as president of the council, with the title… of 
Inquisitor General.”38 Tribunals, typically staffed by two or three chief inquisitors each, were set 
up across the Empire, spanning a massive global network. Tribunals existed at Galicia, Logroño, 
Barcelona, Cartagena, Zaragoza, Valladolid, Madrid, Cuenca, Toledo, Valencia, Llerena, Murcia, 
Cordoba, Granada, and Sevilla (all of which were in Spain) as well as in Palermo (in Sicily), Las Palmas 
(on the Canary Islands), Mexico City (in the Viceroyalty of Mexico), Lima (in the Viceroyalty of Peru), 
Mallorca (on the Balearic Islands), and Sassari (in Sardinia).39 This diffusion was not without 
consequence, however.  
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Different Inquisitional practices took root in some Spanish territories, and some form of 
centralization was required to maintain any degree of judicial consistency. The Suprema took on 
this role, at first accepting into its jurisdiction any appealed cases which were found to be 
questionable or had debatable verdicts. However, as the decades passed, the Suprema 
theoretically eventually became the final deciding authority for every case brought before the 
tribunal courts. Following their original rulings, regional tribunal courts were required to send 
their court documents to the Suprema for review. Though the distance between the tribunals and 
the Suprema made this impractical (though not impossible), the system was centralized and, at 
least in concept, would operate with self-consistency. This system would quickly deteriorate as 
the Suprema became more demanding as a result of tribunal courts frequently relying on their 
own decisions. Over time, these individual tribunal courts began to show deviation from central 
Inquisitional power, leading the Suprema to later request their cases be sent to their headquarters 
to have their verdicts confirmed by the Inquisitor General. In order to understand how these 
tribunals operated, we must examine the ways in which the Inquisition sought out and prosecuted 
its victims. 
When the Inquisition sought to exert its sway in order to quell a rash of heretical or 
treasonous activity in a certain area, it frequently employed a number of tactics that contributed 
to its fearsome reputation. The first and most frequently-used of these was the visitation, in 
which “ecclesiastical officials visit[ed] the most afflicted areas in person”40 in efforts to quell the 
undesirable activity, whether it be heretical, treasonous, or otherwise prosecutable in nature. 
Visitations were treated both as solutions to the myriad symptoms of unrest that the Inquisition 
sought to remedy and as preventative measures taken in order to keep such behaviors or beliefs 
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from spreading. The list of such beliefs included those viewed as a threat to the religious and 
political orthodoxy of Spain, whether that translated to conversos (Jews who had converted to 
Catholicism to avoid prosecution and expulsion from Spain during the Reconquista), moriscos 
(Muslims who had converted to Catholicism for the same reasons), sorcerers, witches, political 
miscreants, or other groups seen as detrimental to the stability of the Spanish Empire.41 The 
inquisitors of a given tribunal nearest the site of the visitation, along other ecclesiastical officials, 
were called upon to execute the duties of visitation periodically. These “regular tours of 
inspection” involved each judge performing “one visitation for four months per year… travelling 
to each area in rotation so that none was overlooked.” Each visitation was typically preceded by 
the reading of the Edict of Faith, a document intended to convey to the Spanish people the crimes 
that were typically investigated during a visitation.42 
The Edict of Faith was a fluid text, continually being updated and modified by inquisitors 
to condemn the most up-to-date perceptions of what constituted heretical behavior. It contained 
in-depth explanations of exactly what the Inquisition sought to prosecute and served as a 
cautionary tool. After 1520, the Edict listed “magic, sorcery, and witchcraft… [as] offences 
implying heresy.”43 This practice can be seen both an instrument of transparent justice and an 
attempt at making the Inquisition’s visitations more justifiable – the Edict was frequently 
distributed prior to the inquisitor’s performance of the visitation and was read in a public place in 
the town or city that was to be visited.44 By organizing their activities in such a way, inquisitors 
educated the populace about how unacceptable or taboo behaviors, such as practicing Judaism or 
Protestantism, were grounds for them to be put on trial. In addition, the Edict made note of 
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“forbidden books and opinions”45, those which were believed to spread or encourage non-
Christian or criminal behavior. As Henningsen explains, “under threat of excommunication, any 
person who had knowledge of [anyone who violated the points of the Edict] was charged to 
present himself and make a secret declaration to the Inquisition without mentioning the matter to 
anyone.”46 The Inquisition’s aim was “to inculcate [in the laity] a sense of the correct behavior 
and the correct beliefs expected of a Christian.”47 At the very least, the Inquisition did not seek to 
obfuscate its intent: the Edict of Faith’s widespread use demonstrates plainly the Inquisition’s 
desire to maintain a judicial system based on inimitably well-communicated laws and policies – 
it was even translated into Italian and used by the Italian Inquisition.48 
The prosecution of accused witches and other dissidents was not always so light, 
however. One of the Inquisition’s most publicized and intimidating tactics was frequently 
employed chiefly as a means of exemplifying, condemning, and humiliating its targets. This 
tactic, known as the auto de fe (“act of faith”), or auto for short, enjoyed widespread use 
throughout Spain, particularly in the northern Basque region. Autos were “carefully devised to 
inspire awe for the mysterious authority of the Inquisition”49 and were fundamentally ceremonies 
in which those accused of crimes to which the Inquisition was opposed were tried, sentenced, 
shamed, and punished in front of large audiences. At an auto in Toledo in 1486, the ritual 
involved the display and sentencing of the accused; this served to showcase the Inquisition’s 
pragmatism and efficiency, though the event was still advertised and held in a public forum, 
most often, in the town or city public square).50 As time progressed, the auto became viewed as a 
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form of “public entertainment. The autos de fe were events which draw an audience from many 
miles around, just as throughout Europe people eagerly traveled for miles to witness an 
execution.”51 The audiences were not an unintentional side effect of the auto’s natural allure, 
either: the Inquisition distributed indulgences to audience members as a form of compensation 
for their attendance.52 This behavior has questionable implications – it could be suggested that 
the Inquisition only sought to make public examples of those who disobeyed the laws set forth 
by Spanish legislature. Henningsen asserts that the autos “had the effect of being both a 
terrifying example and an official confirmation of basic social values, whether it was concerned 
with the protection of the rights of property or the purity of the Christian faith.”53 However, the 
evidence tends to point towards autos as primarily fulfilling the latter, at least in the earlier years 
of their use. After a century or so of the Inquisition’s employment of this strategy, autos became 
glorified and “imposing demonstrations of the authority of the Inquisition.”54 The increasing 
tendency of autos to be treated more as lavish exhibitions of power and less as judiciary 
proceedings can be seen as a symptom of rising arrogance among Inquisitors who believed their 
position to be one of great influence, increased popularity with attending audiences, or a 
necessitated ramping up of auto-related activity as a result of more frequent occurrences of 
prosecutable offenses, but the Inquisition’s original intent was solely one of practicality. In 
contrast to the Inquisition-influenced lands of Spain proper are the Netherlands, a region 
completely devoid of a tribunal. Despite this, the Netherlands also exhibited an early decline in 
witchcraft prosecution and trials. 
Section V: Toverij in the Netherlands 
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 The history of the Netherlands is one marked by relative prosperity interspersed with a 
struggle to deal with an unestablished collective identity. A large portion of the Low Countries 
(which are comprised of modern-day Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) were, in the 
late fourteenth century, governed by Burgundian rulers. This was brought about by a marriage 
between Philip II, the Duke of Burgundy, and Margaret III, the Countess of Flanders in 1384. In 
the following decades, Dutch prosperity grew, especially in terms of economic expansion. Philip 
the Good, who ruled from 1419-1467, also thrust the political tendrils of the Netherlands further, 
claiming several smaller regions for his own. Philip’s granddaughter, Mary of Burgundy, 
married Maximilian I, who was the Holy Roman Emperor until 1519. Maximilian I was 
succeeded by Charles V, who, as Carlos I, was also the king of Spain. This passed control of the 
Netherlands to Spanish hands while they simultaneously remained under the sway of the 
Habsburg line. Charles V attempted to consolidate his family’s control of these territories by 
imposing the Pragmatic Sanction of 1549, which removed the territories of the Low Countries 
from the Holy Roman Empire and instead declared them to be inheritable possessions of his 
successors. The resulting jurisdictional region came to be known as the Seventeen Provinces, a 
non-autonomous conglomeration of counties, duchies, and lordships. Though the small 
component regions that formed the Seventeen Provinces were now united under a single political 
body, they nevertheless had their own individual cultural and judicial traditions that continued. 
 Though all of these policies were regularly practiced within Spain, there were many 
variations in prosecution styles, especially in witchcraft cases, throughout the various imperial 
holdings. According to Gijswijt-Hofstra, the subjects of the Netherlands, which until they 
declared independence from Spain in 1581 belonged completely to the Spanish Habsburg 
Empire, had their own traditions regarding such matters. Witchcraft was blamed for “illness and 
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death… failure of dairy or beer production and of the harvest, setbacks in affairs of love, or bad 
luck when fishing, and even shipwrecks” and was lumped in with “counter-magic… white 
magic… fortune tellers and exorcists… [and] private persons applying magical arts themselves” 
into the Danish concept called Toverij. 55 In comparison to mainland Spain and its other 
territorial holdings, the Dutch were largely free from the imposition of Inquisitorial activity, as 
there existed no tribunal of the Inquisition in the Netherlands. However, Gijswijt-Hofstra notes 
in comparing Spanish territories to other European regions such as the Holy Roman Empire that 
“in Italy and Spain, where the Inquisition was in charge of judicial inquiries into witchcraft, the 
number of executions remained lower and ceased altogether circa 1620.”56 Since Judaizers and 
conversos, the chief targets of the original Inquisition, were not very prevalent, active, or 
threatening in the Netherlands, inquisitorial actions were kept to a minimum – there were no 
autos or any related prosecutorial activities held in the region. 
Despite this absence, the Netherlands serve as an important piece of evidence. With 
different views on witchcraft and different judicial processes, the Dutch were still able to 
effectively curb the spread of witchcraft accusations. Like the Spanish, “the magistrates of the 
Northern Netherlands were seldom inclined to consider witchcraft in terms of the Malleus 
Maleficarum, though they did come to accept the traditional notion of the devil’s pact during the 
sixteenth century.”57 The greatest difference between the Dutch and the Spanish was that of the 
purposes that their trial systems indicated: where the Spanish held lavish ceremonies (such as 
autos de fe) at which the accused were tried and sentenced, “[executions for maleficent 
witchcraft in the Netherlands] were… connected with the gradual introduction of Roman law and 
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ex officio criminal proceedings.”58 These trials emphasized placing the burden of proof on the 
accuser rather than on the accused – in contrast to the proceedings of an auto, where the accused 
had to prove themselves innocent of the crime they had been accused of, the Dutch preferred the 
party associated with the original accusation to be responsible for marshaling enough evidence to 
convict the accused. As Henningsen expresses, this can be seen as a remnant from the old 
accusatorial system of justice, in which trials were conducted without any legal representation 
and were conducted solely as a result of the words and evidence brought forth by the accuser. 
While the “Spanish and Italian inquisitions are known not to have been impressed by 
demonological witchcraft ideas, and to have employed a high standard regarding the 
acceptability of proofs of witchcraft,”59 the Dutch still celebrated great success in limiting the 
spread of witchcraft accusations, as “trials and burnings in the Netherlands were fewer than in 
any other country, and they ended earlier.”60 
This rarity of trials and burnings seems to stem chiefly from Dutch cultural conceptions 
of witchcraft. Comparatively speaking, the Dutch were skeptical of what effects witchcraft could 
have on them; Gijswijt-Hofstra writes in her article Witchcraft in the Netherlands that “the 
inclination to blame certain misfortunes on curses by ‘evil people,’ identified or not, existed to a 
lesser extent [than elsewhere].”61 Though toverij covers a broad spectrum of witchcraft-related 
phenomena (including all types of magic, maleficia, and diabolist activities), it remained a crime 
that saw rare prosecution, particularly among higher social classes.62 One significant limitation in 
Dutch witchcraft prosecution came with the cessation of the death penalty by the beginning of 
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the seventeenth century, demarcating a noticeable shift towards leniency. Gijswijt-Hofstra argues 
that “the low intensity of witchcraft trials in the Netherlands… is due partly to (presumably) 
slight incidence in Friesland, Zeeland, Overijssel, and Drenthe, [and] partly to the comparative 
infrequency of extensive trials.”63 The lack of in-depth investigations, the prohibition of the 
death penalty, and “legal authorities’ decreasing willingness to convict injurious witchcraft 
cases”64 all led to an early decline in witchcraft prosecutions. While trials and witch-hunts in the 
Netherlands were rare by the end of the sixteenth century, “witchcraft trials mostly reached their 
peak in the seventeenth century or even later [in other countries].”65 When compared to nearby 
regions, the Netherlands certainly seem to have solved the dilemma of prosecuting witches early 
on. 
 Despite this outcome, Gijswijt-Hofstra notes that factors influencing judges’ decisions in 
witchcraft cases were relatively unremarkable – they included “their own insight and 
experience,… what they were hearing at a given moment about witchcraft practices in their own 
environment and elsewhere,… possible pressure from superiors to prosecute or to be lenient, 
and… legal advice.”66 This draws our attention instead to the overall lack of paranoia and fear 
that Dutch culture attributed to witchcraft and its practitioners – because there was no culturally 
instilled tradition of extreme anxiety in the face of witchcraft, its prosecution dwindled by the 
early 17th century. While the end of the death penalty was a significant step towards ending this 
prosecution, such a step would only be possible in a culture that was already convinced that 
witchcraft was simply not as large a threat as some other societies had built it up to be. Thus, the 
Netherlands provide us with a key example of how one region of the Spanish Empire was able to 
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mitigate the spread and severity of witchcraft trials without resorting changes in legislation or 
judicial processes. Instead, the Dutch concepts of witchcraft lent themselves to the relaxation of 
prosecutorial activity. Both similar and different to this is the situation that unfolded in Mexico, 
whose culture had far-reaching consequences relating to witchcraft trials; the difference, 
however, lies in the existence of the Mexican Inquisition and the legal presence that it bore 
following its establishment. 
Section VI: The Mexican Inquisition 
When Hernán Cortés first journeyed from Cuba to the Mexican mainland in 1519, he 
entered amidst an ongoing conflict between the Aztec people and their rivals, the people of 
Tlaxcala. He was quick to deceive the Aztecs in order to leverage his position and gain more of 
the gold which he had come for. The Aztec Empire collapsed soon afterward and the Viceroyalty 
of New Spain was established in its place, which soon grew to colossal proportions as a result of 
ongoing conquest and the subjugation of additional native populations. The Viceroyalties of 
Nueva Granada, Peru, and the Rio de la Plata were established in the following centuries, each 
carved out of large tracts of Spanish-held territory in central and South America. Exploration 
continued north through western North America, and eventually a majority of the territory in the 
Americas belonged to the Spanish crown. Mexico did not declare independence from Spain until 
1810, and then did not officially secure independence until it was pulled from the jaws of civil 
war in 1821. The constant struggles between the minority of the population who claimed Spain 
as their home and the majority who were indigenous to central and South America created a 
tense atmosphere of distrust and social inequality that would contribute to later conflict and 
misunderstanding between the two groups. 
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Though Spanish concepts of witchcraft certainly influenced the colonizers of the 
Americas, the circumstances of living amongst the indigenous Native American population 
proved to be completely different from those that defined witch-hunting and Inquisitional 
behavior in Europe. Whereas the chief concerns of the Spanish Inquisition were religious 
dissidents characterized by false claims to Catholicism (as in the case of conversos and 
moriscos), the most frequently perceived threats to Mexican stability came in the form of Native 
Americans and their ignorance of Catholicism. The most common sentiment towards the Natives 
is best articulated by Charles Ralph Boxer, an historian who writes in his book The Church 
Militant and Iberian Expansion 1440-1770 that “[Amerindians] were not considered to be in the 
category of gente de razón (‘intelligent people’) in the same way as were Europeans, creoles, and 
mestizos; and their conversion was considered to be too recent for them to attain the same 
knowledge and comprehension of the Faith.”67 As a result, “an edict of Philip II in 1575… 
[proclaimed that] the Amerindians were exempted from the jurisdiction of the Inquisition.”68 
Since the Inquisition played a sizable role in the prosecution of perceived heathens, witches, and 
heretics, this edict severely limited the numbers of those who would be tried for such crimes. 
Additionally, true judicial proceedings (in the sense of fair trials with representation for the 
accused) against those considered to be sub-humans were rare if not unheard of. 
The defining characteristics of the European judicial practices of Spain and the 
Netherlands are markedly different from the New World’s policies regarding the prosecution of 
witchcraft and superstition. Judaizers and conversos were certainly not an issue to be handled by 
the Inquisition of New Spain; instead, a tribunal was established in Mexico in 1570 in order to 
handle other matters that were more relevant to Mexican affairs. The chief concern of 
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ecclesiastical authorities in the New World was that of indigenous conversion to Catholicism. As 
a sizable portion of church presence in the Americas was devoted to missionary work and the 
Catholicization of the natives, it comes as a surprise that “the 1560’s and the 1570’s saw the end 
of the golden age of missionary endeavor in New Spain… the basic work of conversion was 
achieved… the crown, the bishops, and the secular clergy were encroaching on the privileged 
position of the Mendicant Orders… [and] the apocalyptic and utopian zeal which had inspired 
the earlier generation was noticeably cooled.”69 The decline of the zealous Catholicization of 
Native Americans, therefore, accompanied a steady decline in Native witchcraft trials – 
especially due to the fact that this decline occurred prior to the establishment of the Mexican 
Inquisition’s tribunal. 
While the perceived heresy and godlessness of the natives could scarcely be abided by 
the Spanish, witches of Spanish origin were far from absent in Mexico in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. The Mexican Inquisition “dealt with [sorcery and superstition] in a dual 
manner, Indian and Spanish. Native superstition had a different purpose, namely the pacification 
of the gods and the direction of the forces of nature for man’s benefit. The Spanish sorcerer and 
magician was essentially a nefarious person who capitalized on the ignorance and credulousness 
of his subjects.”70 The differing conditions and cultural significance of witchcraft in Mexico 
translated into a different treatment of those put to trial: “sentences were harsh, but as a rule 
torture was not prescribed to elicit the confession [of the accused],”71 indicating a contrast to the 
nature of prosecution of Native Americans in the same region, which were treated with pity and 
clemency (though at the cost of their being regarded as human beings). This dichotomy between 
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the Spanish colonizers and the allegedly sub-human natives characterizes Mexico as an example 
of a region whose circumstances begat a more lenient atmosphere of witchcraft prosecution. 
Compared to the epicenters of witch-hunting in the Holy Roman Empire, Mexican treatment of 
accused witches was especially forgiving, and this behavior was brought about by the cultural 
and judicial states of situations of the region.  
Section VII: The Roman Inquisition and Italian Witchcraft 
During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Italian peninsula was considered to be 
the center of the Renaissance and all of the cultural transformations that it had to offer. 
Humanism, exemplified in the writings of Erasmus, flowered amidst art and music that glorified 
the human form and human contributions to life and the world. By replacing God as the all-
important central fixture in their lives, the philosophers and artisans of the Renaissance were able 
to give humanity a new lens through which they could view themselves. Importantly, following 
the resolution of the Western Schism between the Avignon and Roman papacies, the Italian 
peninsula was also the home to the center of Christianity at Rome. This made the surrounding 
regions particularly susceptible to the influence of religion and, particularly, Catholicism. As a 
result, a rise in the fear of Protestantism further north in the Holy Roman Empire led to the 
establishment of the Roman Inquisition in July of 1542.72 It is important to note that while the 
Spanish Inquisition was established prior to Luther in order to combat false Christians, the 
Roman Inquisition was established after Luther in order to combat Protestants. Dissidence in 
Italy, however, did not only come from a split between Catholics and Protestants; during the first 
half of the sixteenth century, many of the Italian city-states (as well as the Papal States, which 
included Rome) were engulfed by the Italian Wars, plunging the region into an ongoing and 
transformative conflict. This fighting, coupled with Spain’s looming influence abroad, resulted in 
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the eventual Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559, which gave the Spanish crown control of the 
kingdoms of Milan, Naples, Sardinia, and Sicily. These acquisitions gave Spain an immense 
political advantage on the global scale and served to maintain its position as a superpower. 
Italian treatment of witchcraft can, with little extrapolation, be compared to that of Spain. 
As David Gentilcore writes, “a survey of Italian and Spanish witchcraft literature suggests that a 
stereotypical view of the phenomenon was never widespread in the Mediterranean.”73 In this 
sense, Italy and Spain did not exhibit the same cultural phenomena that were present in England 
and the Holy Roman Empire, where depictions of witchcraft, diabolism, sabbats, or the devil 
were commonly distributed, viewed, and read. Rather than provoking madness or a violent 
outbreak of accusations, Italian witchcraft was addressed with relative calm: “the activity of 
preachers and confessors was… crucial in convincing people that the proper means of reacting to 
supposed acts of sorcery and witchcraft was through the Episcopal tribunals.”74 Trials for 
witchcraft were very infrequent; in Friuli, a region in northern Italy,  777 cases were conducted 
between 1596 and 1785, of which only a portion were related to charges of therapeutic magic 
(199) and maleficia (180).75 Trials in the records of Friuli were categorized by offense: these 
offenses included general magic, divination/necromancy, therapeutic magic, Benandanti 
(members of a cult present in Friuli associated with witchcraft and heresy), love magic, spells 
relating to wolves or storms, spells relating to bullets, wealth spells, other spells, and maleficia. 
In similarity to the Spanish Inquisition, Italian courts seemed to favor public humiliation as a 
form of punishment; but rulings also frequently prescribed regimens of penance in which the 
convicted would be sentenced to recite lengthy prayers for an extended period of time. Despite 
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this, the culture into which Italian witchcraft emerged was, similarly to that of Spain, a relatively 
enlightened one which favored caution over mindless prosecution. 
In the same way that Italian verdicts reflect the culture in which they were decided, these 
selfsame verdicts help us to interpret the influence that Italian judicial systems had upon them. 
An important concept arises in an analysis of Italian considerations of law: “traditional forms of 
justice held sway within the inquisitorial and Episcopal courts [of Mediterranean Europe], based 
on penance, and such concepts as the victimless crime and truth by self-accusation were 
foreign.”76 Many accounts of the witch trials of the Holy Roman Empire and surrounding states 
relate a common theme of self-accusation, noting that many subsequent accusations were 
obtained through the use of torture or other interrogation. It is commonly acknowledged – by 
both contemporaries and current historians – that these accusations may have been made under 
the duress of the trial or torture situation simply in order to avoid further punishment. Therefore, 
the lack of such accusations would immediately reduce the number of trials held in Italian courts. 
Gentilcore further hypothesizes that “although the Roman Inquisition was far more concerned 
with illicit magic – the crime which included witchcraft – than the Spanish, neither treated the 
matter with great severity.”77 In fact, even when trials were conducted and convictions were 
made, capital punishment was used very rarely. Only four of the first one thousand convictions 
in Aquileia-Concordia between 1551 and 1647 resulted in executions; there were only fourteen 
executions in Venice between 1553 and 1588; and Milan only held seven executions between 
1560 and 1630.78 Finally, it is particularly intriguing to note that “between 1537 and 1572, the 
Sicilian Holy Office celebrated nineteen autos-da-fé [sic] during which twenty-two prisoners 
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were sentenced to death.”79 This is fascinating due to the fact that Spanish culture was able to 
pervade Italian culture (even before Spain acquired its Italian territories), displaying the empire’s 
widespread influence as a global superpower. 
Notably similar to the Dutch example is the restraint in employing the death penalty – the 
above figures illustrate a parallel between Italy and the Netherlands. This judicial trend was 
compounded with a notably low rate of conviction for what accusations were brought to the 
attention of the Roman Inquisition: “18 percent [of surviving cases]… produced a verdict and 
sentence… 12 percent [warranted] arrest and detention… 15 percent were not taken up at all… 
14 percent resulted from a voluntary confession... and so did not lead to any further action… 
[and] 40 percent did not lead to… detention or the formal charging of the accused.”80 Though a 
rash of accusations sprung up around the 1580’s and 1590’s, Ruth Martin and William Monter 
agree that “Mediterranean Inquisitions… replaced their ‘preoccupation with heretics by an 
obsession with repressing magical practices and other forms of superstition.’”81 The shift from 
the prosecution of Protestants to the prosecution of witches came after Catholics realized that the 
Reformation was a losing battle, causing the Inquisition to search elsewhere for heresy. As 
Protestantism gained ground towards the middle and end of the Reformation, Protestants became 
less prosecutable and more of a cohesive socio-cultural structure. Despite this trend, the severity 
of convictions was often light and tempered by such factors as repentance or compassion for the 
elderly or sick.82 Cassandra de Fordij, a woman tried in 1584 for witchcraft, was told that should 
she confess, “she would be let off the punishment of… canon law, leaving only the imposition of 
spiritual penances at the discretion of the Holy Office, and these would be that much more 
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moderate and mild as she showed herself worthy by [confessing] such great wickedness.”83 In 
the instance of Italy, it seems that judicial clemency was one of the main reasons for the 
infrequency and early decline of witchcraft prosecutions. 
In a culture trapped among the powerful forces of the Catholic Church and the Spanish 
Empire, the Italian Inquisition managed to find a balance between hard-line religious prosecution 
and the cultural purges that the Spanish empire sought to accomplish with the thoroughness of 
the Inquisition. Ruth Martin believes that “due in very large part to [the simultaneous restraint 
and vigor of the Roman Inquisition], Venice was saved from the true horrors of what has become 
known as the great European witch-hunt.”84 As part of the larger Italian society, Venice serves in 
Martin’s work as an example of how witchcraft prosecution was curbed in the face of lessened 
judicial severity. The enlightened and progressive views of judges and accusers caused 
witchcraft to be viewed as a less serious crime than in other regions, subsequently resulting in far 
fewer trials, convictions, and sentences. In stark contrast to the emphasis placed on a cultural 
solution to witchcraft in the Netherlands, Italy is a region characterized by its intense 
Catholicism, suggesting a culture with considerable intolerance for witchcraft, a crime 
considered to be an egregious affront to the religion. The aspects of heresy, apostasy, and 
blasphemy involved in such a practice ensure that the most likely solution for Italian witchcraft 
was one of a clear-cut judicial approach. Thus, though Italy is completely distinct from the 
Netherlands and from Mexico, its solution remains similar to the Spanish mainland, which 
exhibited a prominent effort to cut back on witchcraft prosecution. This, of course, makes sense, 
since both are largely Catholic and Mediterranean nations with well-established Inquisitions. On 
the other hand, Spanish culture was an important element leading to the diffusion of witch-
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hunting. While they certainly exhibit differences in their methods, both resulted in a steady 
decline of witchcraft prosecutions, illustrating once again the possibility that such an outcome 
could – and in fact had to be – produced by unique aspects of forward thought acting upon 
equally unique regions. 
Section VIII: Summary 
In sum, the experiences of accused witches in Spain, Italy, Mexico, and the Netherlands, 
though similar to one another, occurred for different reasons. In Spain, inquisitors believed 
themselves to be enlightened pursuers of God’s justice, but this failed to stop them from taking 
pity on accused witches, who they considered to be suffering from mental disease rather than 
propagators of diabolism or practitioners of maleficia. While Italy’s inquisitors held many of the 
same beliefs as their Spanish peers, Italian judicial traditions were fundamentally different from 
Spanish ones, lending Italian proceedings a dissimilar atmosphere. The Mexican Inquisition, 
faced with two separate facets of witchcraft (Spanish and Native), was lax in its prosecution of 
both: prosecution of Native Americans was forbidden after 1575, just five years after the 
establishment of the tribunal in Mexico, and Spanish witchcraft in Mexico was infrequent at best. 
In the Netherlands, a territory lacking a tribunal (and therefore a centralized outlet for the 
Inquisition), an ex officio trial system, which appointed representatives in the defense of those 
accused of crimes, was one of the central differences from Spain. Additionally, a completely 
different concept of witchcraft, characterized by an emphasis on maleficia rather than diabolism, 
made the idea of witchcraft less menacing to a less intensely-Catholic nation than Spain. 
Tribunals existed in all of these regions except for the Netherlands, but the sheer distance from 
the Suprema to these tribunals made enforcement of a common law code difficult as two-way 
communication of any sort would be delayed for months at a time. While the role of the Suprema 
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was readily noticeable during Inquisitorial activity in Spain, its constant vigilance was not felt so 
heavily in the outlying regions of the Empire – while its rules were enforced, rapid 
communication between two parties over the Atlantic Ocean or even over the European 
continent was impossible. For example, “by the mid-seventeenth century all cases were required 
to be submitted to the Suprema before being carried out”85 – though this did not necessarily 
translate into judicial leniency toward witchcraft, it certainly made the consistent prosecution of 
witchcraft more difficult without a centralized body responsible for legislative regulation. 
CONCLUSION: How to Interpret This Study 
Historians frequently analyze events as consequences of other events. However, the  
application of this principle are rarely so simple; any number of causes, far-reaching both 
geographically and into the past, can be attributed to a certain effect. In the opposite fashion, any 
one event may have a countless web of effects following it that reach hundreds or thousands of 
years into the future and, in turn, beget their own consequences. There is truly no way for an 
historian to declare convincingly or with any sort of conviction that one event is caused by or an 
effect of another. Therefore, the analysis of how or why a particular circumstance came about – 
in this case, the certain treatments of accused witches at the hands of various forms of Spanish 
judicial and prosecutorial authorities – remains difficult. There remains a plethora of possible 
suspects, including varying popular cultural perceptions of witchcraft, inconsistent standards for 
the upholding and enforcement of Inquisitorial and Spanish Imperial law across the Empire’s 
territories, Inquisitorial influence in a given region, and the distance between trial locations and 
their nearest Inquisitorial tribunal. 
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That is not to say that these are the sole causes of the conflicting severities of treatment 
that accused witches received through the Empire; rather, they are some of the most significant 
and noticeable. Every case in which somebody was tried for witchcraft was different from 
another for many reasons – the people who attended, the town in which they lived, the 
ecclesiastical figures who attended, and any of a multitude of other factors influenced the 
outcome of the trial and the treatment which the accused received. However, a case-by-case 
analysis of witchcraft trials in the Spanish Empire, a global process spanning hundreds of years 
and thousands of miles, would be impractical at best; therefore, it behooves scholars of this era to 
analyze trends and patterns of treatment to see if any common threads present themselves. In this 
case, the common threads surfaced as commonalities segmented by geographic regions, whether 
in the case of Spain, Mexico, the Netherlands, or otherwise.  
What should be taken away from this paper is a sense that the Spanish Empire serves not 
as one example of a solution to witchcraft, but as a diverse selection of solutions. Spain, the 
Netherlands, Italy, and Mexico all “solved” the problem of witchcraft, whether this involved an 
early closure to the death penalty for witchcraft (as in the Netherlands), a redefining of witchcraft 
as a psychological phenomenon rather than a crime as against the church (as in Spain and Italy), 
or a non-issue due to already-present native magic conflicting with unwilling courts (as in 
Mexico). The differences between these solutions stemmed from the differences between the 
cultures and societies in which they were formed, which in turn were products of their individual 
histories. Thus, a near-infinite pool of factors could be considered to have contributed to the 
leniency of witchcraft prosecution in the territories of the Spanish Empire; it is simply this 
paper’s goal to highlight the most salient, significant, and influential ones. As a final thought, 
one should never consider an historical event as part of a timeline or as an incident in a vacuum; 
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rather, every occurrence is surrounded by others, each one acting upon the others in a vast 
tapestry of interconnection. 
